It is slightly more than 30 years since the field of academic intelligence studies began to take a distinct disciplinary form with the nearly simultaneous appearance of its two principle non-classified periodicals. In that period the volume, coverage, sophistication, and impact of scholarship in the field have expanded quite literally by orders of magnitude. And yet, isolated lacunae and thinly covered shoals and sandbanks remain as often as near its heart as its fringes. One such body of shallows is the evolution, role, and significance of defence intelligence. The notion of military intelligence is, of course, a well-established one and the emergence of armed service intelligence functions is an accepted and highly conventional aspect of the highly developed national intelligence evolutionary narrative. 1 Indeed, much of the early work on intelligence dealt with intelligence and war variously at the tactical, theatre, or operational and grand strategic levels. 2 So it is more than a little surprising that very little attention has been paid to defence intelligence. In the UK, there is no official history of defence intelligence to match those 1 this narrative is typified by christopher andrew's seminal Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (london: sceptre 1986). 2 For example, the ground-breaking British official history, H. Hinsley et al.,
of two of the three national agencies and the Joint Intelligence Organisation in the Cabinet Office 3 or 'officially indulged' 4 independent academic history. Despite achieving its fiftieth year in 2015 there has not even been a vaguely hagiographic and less vaguely self-congratulatory moment of celebration comparable to Charles Scanlon's In Defence of the Nation: DIA at Forty Years. 5 To be sure, Huw Dylan (also contributing to this issue) has provided an excellent account of the lineal precursor to Defence Intelligence (DI; prior to 2010 known as the Defence Intelligence Staff or DIS), the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) 6 and I have examined DI's evolving position within the wider machinery of British national intelligence and in contrast with its US counterparts' status and role. 7 Beyond a (rather understandably) disgruntled post-Iraq memoire by one of its senior analysts 8 there are no monographs on UK Defence Intelligence after the 1964 Mountbatten Reforms.
That being said, however, there is also hardly any substantial work on the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the US beyond Scanlon's contribution. Much the same might be said not merely of the other Five Eyes intelligence allies but of the lion's share of other non-Anglophone systems with national agencies consuming more than just the lion's portion of scholarly interest. This includes the much-examined Soviet and Federal Russian systems where the Glaveniye Upravleniye Razvedivatelniye (GRU) has remained a rarely and even then idiosyncratically treated side-topic, 9 almost as ignored as it is unreformed in the wake of the fall of the USSR. And so the academic neglect of defence intelligence as sphere of inquiry is not a peculiarly British malaise, but a malaise of the entire intelligence studies enterprise. As we shall see below, it is a neglect that reflects a long-running and wide-spread official neglect and mismanagement of a vital element of national security assets and capabilities.
The idea of Defence Intelligence
Michael Warner famously warned intelligence scholars and practitioners alike that 'If you cannot define a term of art, then you need to rethink something' , 10 echoing his nineteenth century compatriot Charles Pierce's demand that philosophy serve to 'make one's meaning clear ' . 11 And so it is worth pausing a moment to clarify what exactly is meant by defence intelligence as distinct from national and other forms of intelligence. As noted above, the notion of military intelligence -more precisely armed forces intelligence since, at least in the UK, 'military' historically denoted strictly the Army and War Office -is well established and well understood. Military and naval intelligence branches date to the nineteenth century, with air force intelligence components appearing in short order after the twentieth century emergence of substantial and institutionalized air power. Defence intelligence entities are, however, of a more recent vintage with most organizations badged as such appearing during or after the 1960s. (Washington, dc: usgPo 2001) . 6 Huw dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945 -1964 (oxford: oxford university Press 2014 Taking the British DI/DIS and American DIA as points of departure, one sees two parallel and interconnected criteria for articulating the idea of defence intelligence. The first is the collaborative, in management theory language 'contributive' , 12 sharing of raw intelligence and analytical judgements at a tri-or quad-service (when one includes civilian defence officialdom) level. In the British case this developed to support tri-service joint planning in the 1930s under the auspices of the Chiefs of Staff apparatus that had taken shape in the second half of the 1920s, 13 and in the US to support an analogous need although that did not become compelling until well into the Second World War. 14 We may think of this as the joint intelligence agenda. The second is the provision of intelligence support to unified and integrated tri-service leadership at the political (Cabinet) as well as command staff levels. It is the emergence of amalgamation of armed services under overarching Ministries and Departments of Defence, with Cabinet defence political portfolios, which really drives the emergence of defence intelligence building on earlier peer-group joint intelligence mechanisms.
Thus defence intelligence is perhaps most usefully thought of as quad-service intelligence production in support of defence as a corporate whole as embodied at the official level in a multi-service command staff and unified defence political leadership. 15 Seeing defence intelligence in these terms necessarily means identifying the function with strategic level of military doctrine, decision-making, and policy. It also implies that the role of defence intelligence in the national intelligence community naturally supports and parallels the role of the defence Cabinet portfolio in the wider armature and conduct of national security. As will become apparent, however, these seemingly intuitive inferences present serious difficulties when putting defence intelligence and its associated agencies into practice.
The institution of Defence Intelligence
Part of the problem for the UK is that when referring to Britain's defence intelligence one is not really talking about a single entity but a collective or confederal intelligence-community-in-miniature that evolved into its current intricate form after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the multifarious nature of the defence intelligence function in the UK is one of the reasons for a series of puzzling re-brandings since the mid-1990s. At the turn of the previous decade, Michael Herman noted with a hint of puzzlement that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) intelligence assessment hub had been renamed Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff (DIAS) from the long-standing and well-recognized DIS. 16 This arose because after Front Line First the intelligence empire under the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) had been formally expanded to give him line management of an assortment of additional organizations that had previous stood as entirely separate agencies or formally separate agencies over which CDI had held tasking, and a measure of supervisory authority, at one remove in chain of command. 17 As denoting CDI's organization, Defence Intelligence Staff now stood for a wider apparatus within which the assessment enterprise was merely one amongst equals, and not even first. By 2010 it was felt that even this exercise in distancing had not been enough and the DIS 'brand' was still too identified with a coterie of tweedy analysts sequestered in the Old War Office Building (OWO) and the vague and ambiguous designation 'Defence Intelligence' became the new collective identity for the CDI machine, a phrase that unhelpfully 12 the term is coined by tom Burns and george stalker in Management of Innovation (london: tavistock 1961) pp.120-2. 13 Interestingly, this development has been well-documented in the public domain at least since the second half of the 1950s, see F. M. g. Wilson, The Organization of British Central Government 1914 -1956 (london: george allen & unwin ltd 1957 pp.297-8. 14 suggestive of the lack of regard to defence intelligence as much in the usa and uK, the definitive account of the wartime us Joint Intelligence committee remains larry Valero's 'the american Joint Intelligence committee and estimates of the soviet union, 1945 -1947 ' , Studies in Intelligence 9 (2009 this definition parallels, at a lower institutional level of analysis, that I proposed in 2012 for a definition of national intelligence as intelligence support to the government as a corporate whole (rather than, more narrowly but traditionally), intelligence in support of national security. see davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain is now both generic and brand; with neither especially well understood outside the walls of MoD Main Building, OWO or the gleaming, new-fangled interagency 'floorplate' of RAF Wyton.
In essence, today's Defence Intelligence is divided into two main divisions under CDI. The first and more established identity is DIAS, the institutional originally known as DIS under the Mountbatten Reforms. Headed by a civilian Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (D/CDI) at Director General (two star) level in current Civil Service grades, 18 this is the analytical arm of the agency staffed by a mix of armed service secondees and career civilians (many of whom are 'retreaded' retired service officials). In many respects, it has long being DIAS which has dominated the 'brand identity' of Defence Intelligence chiefly because the agency was (as will be examined in greater detail below) originally created to consolidate the collating and assessment work of the three Service Intelligence Branches and a somewhat experimental post-war quad-service assessment organization, the JIB.
Michael Herman has provided a telling generic character sketch of the DIS 'civilian':
Picture a retired service officer aged fifty-five. As a younger man he had a good average service career, but a posting to intelligence was a self-confirming indication that he was not destined for the top prizes. But he liked the work, took his pension at forty-five and continued the work as a civilian … He is a conscientious man and comfortable in a tight hierarchy in which he and his colleagues do the detailed analysis while those higher up the line draw on it for broad pictures … he is a modest man who does not claim to be a deep thinker about Soviet intentions and strategy. He enjoys getting the detailed analysis right and is respected for his expertise … Intelligence depends greatly on him, and for what he gives he is a bargain … But he fits into a service organization not inclined to challenge military orthodoxy. 19 A younger generation of professional, career analyst has become a more prominent feature of the DIAS cohort since the 1990s, deep thinkers as much on analytic methodology as strategic and defence issues, 20 but retired service personnel (as likely to be female as male, unlike Herman's slightly dated sketch) have remained the mainstay of DIAS. nonetheless, it is not hard to see how the DIAS desk officer stereotype could easily be seen as constrictive not merely by an evolving analytical profession but by the senior leadership of an organization increasingly involved in no less significant high-technology intelligence collection and processing. The other main branch of DI is a very different entity, and it is arguably that part of the agency least well served by Herman's portrait. After the consolidation of CDI's 'empire' most of the Ministry of Defence's intelligence collection components were gathered together under the Director General Intelligence and Geographic Resources. This branch was reconstituted in 2005/6 as an Intelligence Collection Group, headed by a one star serving officer. 21 However, after the restructuring of the MoD's higher management under Lord Levene's 2011 review of MoD organization, 22 it was rebranded the Joint Force Intelligence Group (JFIG) to dovetail it into the establishment of Levene's proposed Joint Force Command (JFC). Headquartered since 2013/4 at the Pathfinder facility at RAF Wyton, JFIG overseas a range of specialist collection and processing units such as the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (formerly the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre, DGIFC [2013] [2014] [2015] , formerly the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, JARIC ); the Defence Geographic Centre, DGC (formerly the Military Survey); the Joint Service Signals Organisation (JSSO, a resuscitated version of the Cold War Composite Signals Organisation 23 ) and a geospatial Engineers unit with the designation Joint Aeronautic and Geospatial Organisation or JAGO. The lion's share of DI's manpower sits in JFIG, which is not surprising. JARIC historically has been roughly the same size as DIAS while Military Survey/DGC numbers more than half again more than both DIAS and JARIC combined. 24 There is generally less transparency surrounding defence intelligence matters in the UK than the national agencies, and so few specifics are available on the manpower of JSSO and JAGO, but JFIG is several times the size of its analytical counterpart. Alongside DIAS and JFIG under CDI is the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) which includes the Defence College of Intelligence and the headquarters of the Army's Intelligence Corps.
Problems with and of Defence Intelligence
Some two decades ago, Michael Herman went to some pains to point out the fact that defence intelligence represented a different class of problems from those conventionally identified as issues in intelligence conceptualization and practice. 25 Defence intelligence was not merely a specific subset of the classic problems but dogged by unique challenges arising from its position in government. Herman's diagnosis of the 'problems of defence intelligence' was, however, one shaped by the experiences and legacies of the Cold War encapsulated barely a half decade after that global nuclear stand-off had drawn to its close. The most fundamental difficulty for defence intelligence, he argued, was that such institutions were subject to an intrinsic conflict of inflict arising from the fact that their institutional and political masters in defence were the likely beneficiaries (or otherwise) of the judgements their intelligencers might reach. Herman suggests something of a perfect storm in which the difficulties of acquiring information on military and strategic systems, enshrouded by an adversary's denial and deception measures, created a miasma of uncertainty. This converged all too easily with a military-institutional inclination towards worst-case appreciations, pressure not to undermine considerable 'Western political capital invested in the Soviet threat' (not to mention comparable financial capital likewise invested) and an ethos where 'on the whole, it is more satisfying, safer professionally and easier to live with oneself and one's colleagues as a military hawk than as a wimp' 26 . All of this was dogged by the absence of a permanent, career cohort of professional analysts comparable to the national intelligence community. The result was a problematic mix of under-and over-estimates of Soviet strength in which the former, once discovered, provided added impetus to the latter.
Such hazards of linked under-and over-estimation have continued to afflict defence intelligence, of course, as inquiries on both sides of the Atlantic concerning erroneous assessments of Iraqi non-conventional weapon (especially nuclear) development programmes prior to 2003 have clearly indicated. 27 To a very real degree, however, the deepest problems associated with defence intelligence are of a different order and more fundamental than those highlighted by Herman. Former DIAS analyst Brian Jones has reflected pointedly on the relationship between Defence Intelligence and central coordination through the Joint Intelligence Committee, a reflection coloured precisely by the chastening experience of the Iraq war. In his view, the Cabinet Office intelligence machinery 'Exists to coordinate the community and to ensure that assessments are independent of motives and pressure which may distort judgements … independent of the vested interests of those who collect intelligence and are 23 the cso was the cold War successor to the joint-service intercept y organisation that was originally set up in the 1920s. see richard norton-taylor and Hugh lanning, A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1980 GCHQ -1991 GCHQ (cheltenham: new clarion 1991 ; Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States, vol. 2, pp.20, 131. 24 Ministry of defence, 'Memorandum from the Ministry of defence: JarIc and Military survey and their Proposed Merger' appended to House of commons select committee on defence Fourteenth Special Report Hc930 (london: HMso 2000). 25 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p.247. likely to be biased in favour of their own inputs, and of those who might be biased to interpret the intelligence to match their own policies or prejudices' . However, on technical and scientific matters, the JIC's Assessments Staff rarely had relevant specialist know-how in-house, consequently: 'As the major repository of all-source intelligence and career intelligence analysts and specialists, the DIS was often the only knowledgeable and experienced contributor to the process. Thus the laudable concept of unbiased assessment was undermined' . 28 That being said, in recent years a range of no less fundamental and persistent problems have shown themselves as being even more formative to the development and current state of affairs in UK defence intelligence. The principle such problems are those of the divided mandate which dogs most defence intelligence institutions regardless of nation or government, the economic problem of fixed sum resourcing, an endemic challenge to public expenditure but one intensified by DI's divided mandate, and the problem of locating any defence intelligence entity simultaneously both beside and above single-Service intelligence functions within the defence institutional hierarchy.
Divided mandate
The first truly pervasive problem of defence intelligence is that it is operationally and institutionally neither here nor there, so to speak. It serves departmental and national requirements, priorities, and political masters, but operates under the enforceable line management of only the former. In some respects, as least, it finds itself amongst equals at the national level where DI is represented on the UK's national Security Council (Official) Committee by the Chief of Defence Intelligence alongside the national agencies and their heads, but as a slightly junior Departmental voice at three star or, in Civil Service 'old money' terms, Deputy Undersecretary (today's Director General grade). By contrast, the security and intelligence agency (SIA) heads and JIC Chair all hold Permanent Secretary status. Even this level of seniority was recently placed in question by Lord Levin's review of defence management in the UK, where it was suggested that the Chief of Defence Intelligence be posted at to two-star level. 29 At the same time, defence intelligence activities and institutions sit a level above the operational intelligence coalface where the greater part of military intelligence work and its impact have taken place over the course of a generation dominated by expeditionary and counter-insurgency operations. In 2015, the defence intelligence function is removed a step from the boom industry of military 'intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance' (ISR) which has dominated so much of defence intelligence work, acquisition and development. And while under a series of activist Directors the DIA has managed to leverage its centrality within the DoD and concentration of analytical and technical competencies to secure a more secure role within the US intelligence and defence communities, 30 in the UK the function and institution alike seem ever more precariously balanced with future prospects characterized by decreased clarity and confidence even though investment elsewhere in the intelligence enterprise has been steadily increasing for two decades.
It is important to stress that the fraught balance between the competing priorities of defence and national intelligence is not merely the consequence of national requirements being laid upon defence intelligence as a post-hoc or opportunistic use of assets and capabilities just because they are there. The central role of defence in wider national security means that the defence intelligence has a comparably central role to play in the production of national security intelligence. In this sense, the tension is intrinsic to the defence role. At the same time, diseconomies 31 of scale in highly specialized and expensive -usually technical -intelligence collection systems that are often most usefully located in the defence architecture (overhead reconnaissance being an example) but generate products of national (or non-defence departmental) significance also means that such dual-use capabilities have to serve both uses to justify the expenditure. To a certain degree, locating a particular system in the defence rather than the foreign affairs portfolio is more a question of accounting and line management (or political) nicety than inherent necessity. Thus defence, and hence defence intelligence, have unavoidable national responsibilities that lie in some competition with defence-only interests. On the one hand, this creates a divided mandate, competing priorities and fraught lines of responsibility. On the other hand, this creates serious resource management problems.
Fixed sum resourcing
While the resource management problems of defence intelligence arise from the same overall intrinsic tensions as those of the divided mandate, they occur at a different level of analysis and in ways that, more often than not, serve to intensify the problems of the divided mandate. Over the decades, a commonly given defence for locating a range of national intelligence capabilities and functions in the US Department of Defence is that they should be less vulnerable to budget cuts as smaller parts of a bigger budget than as small, visible, and vulnerable budget lines in their own right. While the jury might still be out on this in the US, British experience shows clearly and depressingly that this argument absolute does not apply to Whitehall. What British experience shows is that, in the difficult process of carving the (often shrinking) defence fiscal pie, intelligence is almost guaranteed to be first in line for financial predation against more concrete combat and combat-support assets and investments, regardless of the scale or significance of national requirements and priorities that underpin DI's significance in the larger machinery of government and bigger political picture.
In 2011 Lord Levene noted that intelligence does not stand as a Top-Line Budget (TLB) in its own right within the MoD budget but is a line-item within the Central TLB where it 'sits uncomfortably … in the absence of a natural home' . 32 This also means that intelligence is vulnerable to discretionary alterations to its resourcing levels by senior MoD management than would be less the case were it enshrined as a TLB. The steady scaling back of DIAS since the end of the Cold War has widely been reported and frequently decried. DIAS came out of that conflict with an approximate strength of 800, only to be pared by in the latter half of that decade to 600. 33 By 2008 this had dwindled even further to 450. 34 Despite being one of the only intelligence agencies to emerge from Iraq with its reputation intact after the 2004 Butler review, 35 in the midst of the post-2006 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan and the run up to the 2009 'surge' in that theatre, DIAS saw its numbers due to be reduced a further 20%. 36 It was thus, reduced in manpower (to little more than 400) and in morale, 37 that DIAS came into the current decade to be confronted with the so-called Arab Spring, remobilization of ISR and logistical elements to support the French in Mali and the Central African Republic, and during the last two years resurgent Russian aggression in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
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By which I mean systems that would be prohibitively expensive to duplicate in different departments. Imagine, for example, the cost implications of creating parallel reconnaissance satellite programmes for political and military operational purposes in contrast with those of creating multiple centres for the recruitment and handling of covert human sources. Less visible was the whittling down of geospatial (GEOInT) and imagery intelligence (IMInT) capabilities during much the same period. The status of IMInT and GEOInT has been a fraught one for decades 38 and a recurrent point of complaint by successive Intelligence and Security Committees who have consistently argued for greater autonomy or even national status for the function. 39 Between April 2000 and June 2006, the MoD experimented with an amalgamated imagery and mapping organization analogous in some respects to the US national Geospatial Intelligence Agency (nGIA). Headed at one-star level by an Air Commodore, the Defence Geographic & Imagery Intelligence Agency (DGIIA; later the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Agency or DGIA) essentially created an additional layer of management on top of JARIC and DGC. From 2002 to 2005, the operating costs of DGIIA were reduced steadily from £144.766 million in 2002-3 to £141.902 million in 2003-4 and in 2004-5 to £130.430 million. 40 Bizarrely, this decline covered not only the intensified level of activity immediately after 11 September 2001 and the early stages of Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan but also the British contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Operation TELIC. Indeed, 2003-4 saw some increase in spending on 'operating activities' of £3.191 million over the TELIC period -even though overall spending was being reduced by only slightly less (£2.874 million) -only to have that expenditure drop to below 2002 levels the following year. 41 Only slightly less striking than the pattern of reduction during a period of much heightened military operational activity and generally raised threat levels is the very small sums covered by the entire imagery and mapping enterprise and their fluctuations.
The essential point to be gleaned from these indicators is that intelligence spending where controlled by the MoD consistently takes a low priority in Departmental financial priorities as compared with other combat operational spending priorities -even during times of conflict or crisis. By comparison, the SIA increased from around £940 million to £1,126 million during the same period. 42 Driven by the particular tooth-to-tail spending priorities of the armed forces, intelligence resourcing as actually far more vulnerable within a Departmental budget than national intelligence has been as a high-profile, stand-alone budget line.
Institutional hierarchy
A troubled question on both sides of the Atlantic has been the relationship between defence intelligence agencies and the various single-service intelligence branches of the armed forces. Both DIS and DIA were established with a similar organizational aim, but driven by very different considerations and contexts that are almost archetypical of the evolution of the two intelligence communities. In both cases, the proposed defence intelligence organization was intended to take the shape of a hostile take-over of armed forces intelligence from the corporate centre of defence, a merger that would have seen the independent headquarters of the service intelligence branches dismantled and the those branches abolished as separate agencies. In the US, Secretary of Defence Robert Mcnamara was motivated to abolish the separate service intelligence agencies in order to mitigate or do away with the Zegartesque intelligence cacophony of competing service views and interests with which he found himself confronted on taking office. 43 By contrast, in the UK, amalgamating the service intelligence branches was seen primarily as a cost-saving measure, in parts by reducing executive and senior working-level salaries and overheads, doing away with parallel administrative architectures, and finally identifying and eliminating any redundant activities across the three service intelligence branches and the post-war, Annual Report 1999 -2000 (london: tso 2000 Annual Report 2001 -2002 (london: tso 2002 Annual Report 2003 -2004 (london: tso 2004 Annual Report and Accounts 2003-2004, p.24; Annual Report and Accounts 2004-2005, p.28. 42 see Intelligence and security committee, Annual Reports for the same period (london: tso 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) . 43 davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States, Vol. 1, pp.149-50, 235-6. quad-service JIB. 44 In the US that hostile takeover was an almost complete failure leaving DIA and its Director all but surplus to requirements -except as a stalking horse for DoD institutional rivalries with the civilian intelligence agencies like the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and (especially keenly) the Central Intelligence Agency -until the cusp of the 1990s. In the UK, however, the effort was only too successful with Britain really only awakening to the unintended consequences of that putative success a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War.
Both Peter Davies 45 (a contributor to this volume) and myself 46 have, separately and elsewhere, examined how British plans to amalgamate the individual Service intelligence branches (SIBs) into the Defence Intelligence Staff took place, and how for an interval DIS simply entailed placing the SIBs under a common MoD line management with JIB. This did not last long and, under an organizational doctrine called 'functionalization' , the top managements of the three SIBs and their staff organizations were abolished and the single-serve geographical and functional sections amalgamated under a Directorate of Service Intelligence (DS Int). The theory was that Service DS Int representatives would produce the single-service appreciations for their respective chiefs of staff that the defunct SIBs had existed to provide with the advantage of being able to draw jointly on the resources and views of collocated colleagues from the other Services and former JIB.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the focus of DIS was intelligence support at a joint level to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoS) and to Ministers, essentially as a strategic asset. And so while the DS Int sections existed in principle to provide continuity of single-service intelligence support, as a whole DIS and its senior management were beholden to central defence requirements, such as those articulated from the 1980s under the nATO Collection Coordination and Requirements Management (CCIRM) process. 47 Unsurprisingly, this applied a competing pressure upon the single Service responsibilities of the DS Int sections which reduced the relative importance of both strategic and operational intelligence support in their workflows. Over the subsequent decade, the doctrine of withdrawal from 'East of Suez' dismantled the most of the UK's deployed defence and joint military operational intelligence arrangements such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), Joint Intelligence Bureau (Far East), and Joint Air Reconnaissance (Far East) based at Phoenix Park in Singapore and, closer to home (and technically west of Suez), a scaling down of their counterparts in Cyprus such as JARIC (near East) and the Middle East version of the JIB. Consequently, just as the headquarters service intelligence functions were reducing their engagement in potential theatre-or campaign-level intelligence support to operational commanders the permanent, deployed operational intelligence architectures were also being dismantled.
As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere, 48 by the end of the 1970s, only the British Army retained a permanent, career-path intelligence trade in its Intelligence Corps and even that was seen in the first instance as tactical in the first instance and then operational in its work for elements such as the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). 49 With the loss of ACAS(I) and DnI, neither the Royal Air Force nor the navy had either a standing single-service operational intelligence function or an intelligence trade. With the Army seen as colonizing the lion's share of joint intelligence appointments simply because of 44 Pete davies, 'estimating soviet Power: the creation of Britain's defence Intelligence staff 1960 -1964 ' , Intelligence and National security 26/6 (2011 davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States, Vol. 2, pp.182-6; davies, ' defence Intelligence in the uK after the Mountbatten reforms' , pp.201-3.
Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, pp.84, 195; davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States, Vol. 2, davies, 'defence Intelligence in the uK after the Mountbatten reforms ' , pp.208-9. 49 like much on the military intelligence front after the second World War, the Intelligence corps is woefully under examined. For one of the few, dated and imperfectly informed attempts to articulate the role of the 'Int corps' see Peter gudgin, MI? Military Intelligence: The British Story (london: arms and armour Press 1989) pp.83-6, and historically Jock Hasswell, British Military Intelligence (london: Wiedenfeld and nicholson 1973).
its available pool of Int Corps professional intelligence practitioners, 50 and the sobering lessons of the intelligence demands of the First Gulf War, the Royal Air Force set about re-establishing a single-service Air Intelligence Centre at its Air Warfare Centre at RAF Waddington. It took the embarrassing political fallout of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps small-boat swarming attack on a boarding party from HMS Cornwall in March 2007 to give urgency and impetus to a previously moribund 2005 initiative to re-establish a naval Intelligence or n2 function within the navy.
The result has been establishment of a suite of single-Service intelligence fusion centres (the Air Warfare Intelligence Centre, Land Intelligence Fusion Centre, and Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre) alongside a central, strategic joint defence intelligence apparatus (DI in general and DIAS in particular). There is a degree to which, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it seems that the UK has returned to a version of the status quo ante prior to 1963. If this is the case, however, this reflects less a failure of the central DI apparatus as such than the unintended consequences not merely of creating a central defence but also abolishing separate SIBs in the process. And for all the degrees to which the US DIA can be said to have fallen short of its original promise of a coordinated and coherent defence and military intelligence enterprise (until Soyster's term as D/DIA), at least the US avoided decapitating its own permanent operational intelligence capabilities. In the UK, it appears, the one joint intelligence relationship that remains to be firmly worked out and bedded in is that between central-and single-service intelligence functions within the MoD.
The problem of indifference
A persistent issue throughout the evolution of Defence Intelligence in Britain has been the lack of independent scrutiny. Ironically, the supposedly secretive national agencies have had clear and more robust regulatory, oversight, and accountability frameworks from the old 1985 Interception of Communications Act to the 1994 Intelligence Services Act than have ever been applied to military and defence intelligence elements. To be sure, over a decade the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) managed to extend its remit informally to cover defence intelligence as well as the central intelligence machinery in Cabinet Office, 51 a reach only formally placed on a statutory footing under the 2013 Justice and Security Act. 52 But the ISC's original remit was purely concerned with the national agencies alone. 53 To a limited degree, some of the slack has been taken up by other Parliamentary committees. The most visible such case in the late 1990s was the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee's damning report on the stillborn, £41 million TRAWLERMAn computer system intended for the then-DIS. 54 In terms of on-going oversight and transparency, however, much of the most significant discussion of defence and military intelligence matters has been provided by the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence. This body has produced a number of reports on defence intelligence and ISTAR concerns over the last two decades. 55 However, these have received significantly less attention that the reports produced by the ISC, even though they touch on areas of comparable security sensitivity and strategic significance (such as the IMInT special relationship with the USA or JARIC performance during specific House of commons Public accounts select committee, 18 th Report 1997 -1998 : Ministry of Defence: Project TRAWLERMAN (london: HMso 1998 which reported, inter alia, that after cancellation in 1996 as not fit for purpose at a cost of £41 million the Mod subsequently acquired a replacement system the following year for £6 million. 55 see House of commons select committee on defence, Seventh Report 1994 -1995 : Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Hc 319 (london: HMso 1995 Fifth Report 1999 -2000 : The Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency Hc 100 (london: tso 2000 ; Fourteenth Special Report Session 1999 Session -2000 Session (london: tso 2000 ; campaigns such as Kosovo). 56 It is hard to imagine either the CIA's analytical Directorate of Intelligence, IDAS's natural counterpart, or the national Geospatial Intelligence Agency, analogous to JARIC/DIFC, being so asphyxiated by persistent and pervasive public and political indifference.
The problem of scrutiny and lustration for DI is not the hoary old image of rogue elephants rampaging off the political reservation but the less dramatic but more practical and common one of value for money. 57 If an organization or function is insufficiently resourced, that can reach a level where the investment made is insufficient to meet the minimum requirements laid upon it because it falls below a minimum working threshold. 58 At that point, even those bare-bones investments become a wasted expenditure because the benefits yielded no longer justify that money or manpower. As we have seen, the ISC has repeatedly warned that DI is not resourced sufficiently to meet its combination of national and Departmental requirements -let alone operational intelligence demands in-theatre -and the Commons Defence Committee has challenged the relative investment in analysis and exploitation as against collection. But these moments of lustration have historically been relegated on the fringes of these committees' interests. Even after changes under the 2013 Act, public furores such as domestic Jihadi violence and the Edward Snowden allegations have absorbed most public attention and the scarce investigatory resources of both standing and ad hoc oversight bodies. 59 At the same time, the formal expansion of the ISC's remit under the 2013 leaves a possible question mark over whether the Commons Defence Committee will see any point in producing future reports on ISR and defence intelligence. This suggests a risk that defence and military intelligence are likely to fall into the gaps between the various oversight processes of today's putatively more transparent British government.
Prospects and implications
Both the divided mandate and resource allocation issues have been principle points of discussion when DI has received attention from commentators and official reviews alike. As has been noted, the Intelligence and Security Committee has raised these issues with dogged regularity, and even repeatedly raised the possibility of cross-subsidizing work conducted in support of national requirements and priorities from the Single Intelligence Account. Although this proposal would both take a substantial volume of DI work off the defence spending account while also firewalling national work from the fixed-sum spending pressures that affect the MoD, it has consistently achieved little or no traction. It has been suggested in some quarters that there is a concern amongst the national agencies that this would involve taking SIA funds away from the agencies, thereby weakening investment in those 56 notably, like detailed sIa figures in Isc reports, detailed items referencing uK access to talent-KeyHole materials are at least partially redacted in the published reports, although this clearly indicates the sensitivity of the materials on which defence committee members are briefed. see witness evidence for Fifth Report 1999 Report -2000 Isc 2013) ), and contributed to the production of two substantial reports by the Isc (Access to Communications Data by the Intelligence and Security Services (london: tso 2013); Privacy and Security: a Modern Legal Framework (london: tso 2015), and an independent review by david anderson Qc, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (london: Williams lea group 2015), during much the same interval that the Isc was also producing its even more detailed report on the killing of lee rigby, Isc Report on Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby (london: tso 2014)).
organizations. 60 This suggestion has, however, little credibility. Cross-subsidy proposals have never been about reallocating money away from the agencies but about taking funds already directed towards intelligence in the MoD's Central TLB and managing them through the SIA instead. It is hard, therefore, to see why cross-subsidy suggestions have fallen on such stony ground, unless Defence officials are simply resistant to seeing any MoD funds redirected elsewhere -perhaps even, in the bleakest scenario, precisely so that DI-earmarked moneys provide a nest egg that can be raided for other needs as and when.
The institutional hierarchy problem is still in flux, and the future of DIAS deeply in doubt. As noted, the three armed service components have effectively had to re-established service intelligence branches under the guise of the buzzword-friendly rebranding of 'fusion centres' . Less obvious is the impact on DIAS. Rather than returning to a revivified Kenneth Strong JIB formula, DIAS appears increasingly balkanized with the all-source task evolving into a distributed rather than concentrated function. While a sizeable portion of DIAS still sits in the OWO, that component of the organization has been under pressure to relocate for some time while MoD finance managers seek to realize the real estate value of the central London land upon which it resides. More crucially, one part has moved into the MoD Main Building to provide operational intelligence support to the Chiefs of Staff, another has moved to Joint Force Headquarters at northwood, and still another portion is being relocated to join the Pathfinder enterprise at RAF Wyton. In this setting, these DIAS elements fall under some very diverse dual-control line management between D/CDI as head of DIAS on the one hand, and the headquarters authority of the Defence Staff in London, CO of JFC in northwood, and Commander Joint Force Intelligence Group at Wyton, respectively. Apart from acting as a shop steward for the all-source profession, it is increasingly hard to see what real authority D/CDI can wield over the work and conditions of the further flung parts of his organization.
If one looks at the recent evolution of all-source analysis as a taught skill set of principles and analytical techniques (structured or otherwise), the work of DIAS looks less like the kind of thing that needs its own organizational silo and more like a suite of supplementary skills that can be incorporated into the skill-sets of more technologically and professionally distinct intelligence disciplines and organizations. The future for defence intelligence assessment appears less of institutional reform or adaptation than a more fundamental transformation into a fluid and constantly shifting network of analytic cells, project teams, and task forces. D/CDI might survive as a sort of 'head of profession' , but it seems increasingly unlikely that DIAS, or an equivalent, will continue to exist within a decade or so. The more plausible scenario is an almost transient, peripatetic community of all-source practitioners liable to re-tasking and relocation around Whitehall, mainland UK headquarters, and deployed commands bound together not by a common line management but common training and methods inculcated by programmes like the Defence Intelligence Assessment Course at the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) at Chicksands.
It is more than ironic that less secrecy surrounds the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) than Defence Intelligence and that SIS should be more a household name as MI6 than any actual military or defence intelligence element. Like so many of the failures to deal with the difficulties and dilemmas of defence intelligence in the UK, it is a tragedy and one played out over decades where the cost in blood and treasure has been largely overlooked or ignored by the public, press, and politicians alike. But there are reasons to believe that this is not peculiar to the British experience. As has also been noted above, counterpart issues and concerns are readily discerned when setting the UK's experience against that of the USA, and it would seem likely therefore that these problems are likely to be more widespread. A major consideration is the degree to which defence ministries encompass their own proprietary intelligence communities composed of various single-service, joint-service, and defence intelligence components. How these sub-communities, almost in the sociological sense intelligence subcultures, 61 and perhaps other departmental intelligence subcultures, relate within themselves as well as to the central, national intelligence apparatus remains an area that warrant far deeper investigation globally, not just in the Anglosphere and amongst its allies. It is also evident that close examination of defence intelligence institutions casts the so-called 'intelligence community' , both in terms of national intelligence institutions and as an interagency enterprise across government, as a corporate whole in a very different (and often less flattering) light than studies focused exclusively at the national level. The study of defence intelligence therefore has the potential the play the role of what Talcott Parsons has referred to as a 'residual category' 62 or Thomas Kuhn's notion as an 'anomaly' , 63 that is, a problem on the flanks of a subject that has the potential to transform our basic understanding of that subject once it is thoroughly investigated.
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